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This chapter explores the relationship of U.S. defense management to public administration. It argues that 
public administration, as a field of study, plays a minor role in defense acquisition, because acquisition 
has unique characteristics that separate it from the mainstream of the field. The tenuous connections 
between acquisition and public administration have led to an issue of academic legitimacy in that the 
discipline has failed to respond to the needs of acquisition professionals. The chapter then presents a 
discussion and illustration of philosophical pragmatism as a potential contribution of administrative 
theory to acquisition practice, and it concludes with thoughts on the potential for acquisition to adopt 
pragmatism as a guiding way for thought and practice.
INTRODUCTION: THE ACQUISITION-PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION GAP
In American scholarship, a poor fit has long existed between studies of the military and the field of 
public administration (PA). In a Public Administration Review section on national security, Jefferies 
(1977) noted a dearth of scholarly publications on defense matters and attributed it to several factors: 
first, a civilianizing tendency in the military which gives it a preference for the techniques of business; 
second, the unique nature of the military ethic and the military profession that sets its members apart 
from the rest of the public service; and third, a perception from mainstream PA that military matters are 
unique and separate in many ways (e.g. the armed forces should be studied as an instrument of foreign 
policy rather than as a participant in domestic administration). Mayer and Khademian (1996) argued 
that the disciplinary gap between students of PA and students of the American military was the result 
of scholars’ often implicit assumptions that politics is and should remain separate from the formation 
of national security policy. Stever (1999) described this separation as a glass firewall that was erected 
as early twentieth century administrative theory developed under Progressive state theory that failed to 
include the military realm.
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Interestingly, Jefferies (1977) and Mayer and Khademian (1996) use the same particular activity, de-
fense acquisition, to suggest how the gap might be bridged. Jefferies demonstrates the mutuality between 
defense and public administration by discussing first, the political roles played by military officers in 
dealing with Congress on acquisition issues, and second, the pervasiveness of government contracting 
in acquisition. He argues that the central issue of government contracting is not one of method or tech-
nique that is unique to the military, but rather is a much broader one that deals with the proper role of 
government in a democracy: “Does the government adequately develop and maintain policy direction 
and control over private organizations performing under contract, or do private organizations unduly 
influence government policy?” (1977, p. 331). Mayer and Khademian agree, asserting that defense ac-
quisition “embodies exactly the same accountability and control problems that exist in every other area 
of government administration” (1996, p. 187).
Notwithstanding these arguments, the gap persists. Snider and Rendon (2012) and Shaffer and Snider 
(2014) have documented a continuing lack of attention within PA to public procurement in general and 
to defense acquisition in particular. Thus, calls for PA to pay increased attention to defense acquisition 
apparently have not worked.
This chapter takes a different tack in arguing that the gap may be due to defense acquisition (hereaf-
ter, ‘acquisition’) paying little or no attention to PA as a field of study. That is, acquisition professionals 
see at best only tenuous connections between their enterprise and PA. Essentially, the divide between 
acquisition and PA as described here has its roots in an issue of academic legitimacy, which arises when 
a discipline’s “agreed-upon bases of theory fail to respond to the needs of actors in the field” (Denhardt, 
1984, p. 150).
This chapter addresses this condition in two ways. The first part of the chapter describes three main 
characteristics or dimensions of acquisition which have precluded PA from influencing it to a greater 
extent: first, acquisition is managed and controlled by the military; second, the disciplines of engineering 
and business are more highly valued than PA in acquisition education; and third, acquisition is largely 
atheoretical and practice-oriented (Shaffer and Snider, 2014). This discussion indicates the unique context 
of acquisition which lends to its professionals the perception that PA has little to offer as a guiding field 
of theory and practice. The second part of the chapter describes philosophical pragmatism, which has 
recently experienced a revival in PA thought, and which offers to acquisition professionals a potentially 
viable and promising alternative to respond to their needs. Possible ways in which pragmatism might 
transform acquisition practice are discussed. The chapter concludes with some thoughts on the difficulty 
in moving acquisition, and PA in general, towards more widespread reliance on pragmatic approaches.
REASONS WHY ACQUISITION PAYS LITTLE 
ATTENTION TO PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
• Acquisition as a Military Function: Acquisition is configured as a distinctly military rather than 
an administrative function in at least two significant ways. First, the locus of acquisition is within 
the military services, that is, within the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Second, the great majority of 
acquisition administrators who hold key program manager (PM) positions are uniformed officers.
• Control by the Services: For the most part, the management of contemporary acquisition is 
controlled within the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. In a sense, not much has 
changed in this respect since the nation’s founding. Until 1947 when the Department of Defense 
188
Defense Acquisition, Public Administration, and Pragmatism
 
(DoD) was established, procurement functions were wholly located in the executive Departments 
of War and the Navy. Since that time the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has gradually 
gained some control over acquisition in terms of policy-making, oversight, and decision authority 
for the largest weapons acquisition programs, and some acquisition support functions have been 
given to joint or multi-service agencies. Yet acquisition remains primarily within the purview of 
each individual service, and each service maintains its own organizations and resources for that 
purpose. For example, each service maintains an acquisition staff in its Pentagon headquarters 
to oversee and manage the dozens of programs being executed across the country. Each service 
has its own agencies to perform needs assessments and analysis in support of new programs. The 
services also each have large materiel and systems commands that are responsible for acquisition 
support activities such as testing, fielding, and logistics.
• Uniformed Officers in Key Acquisition Positions: Acquisition’s close association with the mili-
tary is also evident in the large majority of uniformed officers that the services have historically 
appointed to hold PM positions. Garcia et al. (1997) reported that, although military members 
make up only fifteen percent of the defense acquisition workforce, they hold more than eighty-five 
percent of the PM positions for major weapons programs (p. 303). Snider (2011, p. 47) found that, 
from 1997-2010, eighty percent of major PM positions were held by uniformed officers. The most 
common explanation for this seems to be that the operational experience of the uniformed officer 
enables him or her to understand and respond to the needs of the operational user (Lockwood, 
1985, pp. 16-17). Thus, a PM’s ‘warrior perspective’ seems to be valued at least as highly as his 
or her managerial skills or experience.
• Technical and Business Skills Are Valued in Acquisition: One reason for the preference for 
technical and business disciplines over PA as disciplines of choice in acquisition is that DoD relies 
on private industry for the vast majority of the weapons and other products it uses. Indeed, much 
of acquisition emphasis is on managing, via contracts, the weapons development and production 
efforts of private companies. Thus acquisition may be as much about ‘private’ administration as 
it is about PA.
Further, the context of defense program management is at least as much technological as administra-
tive. Most writers locate its roots in the management of large, highly complex weapons projects, such 
as the Manhattan project and aerospace projects, during and following World War II (Acker, 1993, pp. 
4-5; Przemieniecki, 1993, p. 13). Project management concepts, methods, and organizations became the 
means by which DoD attempted to exploit and integrate technological advances in increasingly capable 
and complex weapon systems that often took many years to design and produce.
DoD’s general preference for business approaches has been well described by Jefferies (1977). It 
should be noted, however, that acquisition’s historical preference for technical disciplines may have 
overshadowed attention to business concerns, as Fox (1974, p. 199) has described:
For the past two decades many in the Defense department have not recognized that business management 
skills are distinct from engineering and scientific skills. A general in one of the larger buying commands 
commented: “One of the causes of our current problems arises from the fact that we failed to recognize 
that a program manager must be a business manager and need not be an expert scientist or an expert 
engineer.” In private industry the scientists and engineers who work on defense programs can usually 
count on the assistance of skilled financial and business analysts from within their own company. This 
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support capability is rarely present in Defense department program offices. Some Government program 
managers hire engineering or technical consultants from outside the Government on a part-time basis. 
In the area of business management, however, they are reluctant to request outside assistance because 
they feel this would call attention to their own lack of management capability.
Evidence for increased attention to business in acquisition is found in the Defense Acquisition Work-
force Improvement Act (DAWIA), which was passed as part of the Defense Authorization Act for 1991. 
Among other provisions, DAWIA established ‘acquisition corps’ for each of the services. One require-
ment for admission was “at least twenty-four semester credit hours (or the equivalent) of study from an 
accredited institution of higher education from among [business] disciplines”. (Schmoll, 1996, p. 167).
Finally, the preference for technical and business skills is indicated by graduate degree programs for 
acquisition officers. Each year the services pay for a certain number of officers to attend graduate school 
on a full-time basis to obtain Master’s degrees, but Master of Public Administration degrees are little in 
evidence. In fiscal year 1998, for example, the Army sent about seventy-five of its acquisition officers to 
graduate school. These officers pursued degrees in engineering, computer science, information systems, 
business, and management; none obtained the Master of Public Administration degree (Flom, 1998).
• Acquisition as an Atheoretical, Practice-Oriented Field: The educational programs and em-
phases discussed in the previous section apply to a fairly small segment of the acquisition work-
force. Indeed, acquisition as a separate field has really paid very little attention to theory.
Much less attention has gone to acquisition education and research. There are a few textbooks dedicated 
to defense acquisition (e.g., Rendon and Snider, 2008), and both the Navy and the Air Force have insti-
tuted acquisition management curricula at their respective graduate schools. These generally rely upon: 
(1) a core of management discipline such as organization theory, economics, accounting, and financial 
management; (2) the bodies of knowledge developed by professional associations with ties to acquisition 
functional areas (e.g., National Contract Management Association, Project Management Institute); and 
(3) acquisition training materials. Acquisition and procurement research has received some attention 
over the years (Babione, 1975; Lorette, 1977; Martin et al., 1978), but there is little evidence of interest 
in developing of what might be called ‘acquisition theory.’ A few programs of research in acquisition 
have emerged, such as DAU’s External Acquisition Research Program (Nissen, Snider and Lewis, 2002), 
which operated from 1998-2001, and the Naval Postgraduate School’s Acquisition Research Program 
(Shaffer and Snider, 2014), continuing since 2003.
As for scholarly journals, DAU has since 1996 published a refereed journal, Acquisition Review 
Quarterly. The International Journal of Defense Acquisition Management operated between 2008 and 
2014 as a joint effort of Cranfield University and the Naval Postgraduate School.
To summarize this point, contemporary defense acquisition proceeds largely as an interdisciplinary 
field of professional practice with neither an explicit underlying theory nor much evident interest in the 
development of theory. The result here is of course not only the neglect of PA as a discipline, but also 
the neglect of any activities that could lead to an understanding of the important questions and enduring 
themes that might define acquisition as a unique area of inquiry.
• Acquisition’s Unique Contexts: While a ‘politics-administration dichotomy’ may have charac-
terized an earlier period of its intellectual history, PA today is recognized as integrating these 
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two contexts (Schick, 1978, pp. 152-154). That is, administrative ‘POSDCORB’ processes occur 
within and in conjunction with political processes. Thus, in PA, issues of efficiency, economy, and 
effectiveness are melded with those of power, law, responsibility, and equity.
Defense acquisition also integrates different contexts or dimensions. While some may argue for a dif-
ferent set, the discussion of this chapter has suggested at least four. These include first, a military dimen-
sion that is characterized by issues and considerations such as the primacy of national security, victory 
through armed combat, and soldierly sacrifice. Second, acquisition includes a technological dimension 
that reflects an emphasis on the military advantage that accrues from technologically advanced, state-of-
the-art weapon systems. The U.S. continually invests heavily in R&D activities to achieve and maintain 
this advantage. Third, as noted by Jefferies (1977), Mayer and Khademian (1996), and many others, 
acquisition has a strong political dimension. Because of the huge amounts of dollars at stake, acquisition 
is highly charged with politics and often associated with the least attractive aspects--Congressional ‘pork’ 
for example – of the U.S. political system. Further, acquisition seems to provide regular new exemplars of 
what many perceive as waste and mismanagement. Judging from the long line of executive commissions 
and legislative panels convened over the years to investigate these problems (Horgan, 1995), acquisition 
is a perennial lightning rod for reform efforts by politicians. Finally, acquisition includes a dimension 
of administration, though, as noted earlier, it is concerned to a significant extent with administration of 
private sector industrial and business firms as well as public organizations.
This way of characterizing PA and defense acquisition as integrating various contexts helps explain 
why they don’t fit well together (Figure 1). Acquisition’s unique dimensions, particularly its military and 
technological dimensions, pull it to a point better described as at the edge of PA than in its mainstream.
PRAGMATISM AND ACQUISITION
Earlier it was suggested that the gap between acquisition and PA involved an issue of legitimacy – that 
actors in the field of acquisition do not see PA theory as responding to their needs. This does not mean, 
of course, that PA theory has not developed in potentially useful ways, but rather that acquisition profes-
sionals have not recognized those developments as useful or beneficial.
Figure 1. Contexts of acquisition and public administration
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One such theoretical development, American pragmatism, emerged around the turn of the twentieth 
century at about the same time that American public administration was emerging as a self-aware field 
of study. Influences of pragmatism were evident throughout PA’s early years, though the strength and 
extent of its influence have been questioned, as will be described below.
Pragmatic theories are practice-based and thus have a local, situational, and tentative character. They 
are simply hypotheses about actions that might work to resolve problematic situations. Such an approach 
to theory development seems appropriate for a contemporary professional field like acquisition for at 
least two reasons. First, acquisition is a highly complex enterprise that entails the overlap and interplay of 
the contexts mentioned above. Second, each of these contexts is continually evolving in important ways. 
Under these conditions, the development of stable theories and definitive bodies of professional knowl-
edge becomes problematical. The pragmatic approach, on the other hand, resolves the legitimacy issue 
referred to above through an integration of administrative theory with the practice of defense acquisition.
The remainder of the chapter seeks to illustrate how acquisition might be different today if it had taken 
pragmatism on as a more prevalent perspective. The reader may think of this essentially as subjecting 
pragmatism to its own test. Pragmatism’s core premise is that ideas have clear meanings only in operation, 
that is, in terms of their actions, effects, or consequences. Thus, in order to gain a better understanding 
of the concept of pragmatism in acquisition, one should look to its effects and consequences as it is 
operationalized in specific settings.
Pragmatism’s Development: Peirce, James, and Dewey
Pragmatism came to prominence as a philosophical system at the end of the nineteenth century, a period 
so charged with change that Henry Steele Commager termed it “the watershed of American history” 
(1950, p. 41). Judging that neither nineteenth century rationalism nor empiricism fit the times, pragma-
tism’s early proponents – most notably Charles S. Peirce, William James, and John Dewey –developed 
their system of thought to mediate between these two philosophies (Stumpf, 1966, pp. 402-404). Because 
pragmatism grounds meaning in experience rather than in abstract concepts, it allowed for the setting 
aside of potentially paralyzing debates over values and ultimate ends in favor of experimental action, 
while preserving judgments of value in the facts of an action’s effects and consequences.
Peirce, who is generally regarded as pragmatism’s founder, developed it as “a method for ascertaining 
the real meaning of any concept, doctrine, proposition, word, or other sign” (in Moore, 1961, p. 38), as 
suggested in his ‘pragmatic maxim’:
Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our 
conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object. 
(in Scheffler, 1986, pp. 77-78)
Peirce held that if the meaning of an idea is based on observable and verifiable experiences of its 
effects, then beliefs can be fixed in a public sense when a community of inquirers agrees on the mean-
ings of those effects. This communitarian character of pragmatism made it, he argued, a more scientific 
method than other approaches that served to fix beliefs in an individual and private sense, thereby sub-
jecting them to personal prejudices (Turrisi, 1997, pp. 90-92). Peirce’s pragmatism requires that, if one 
states a particular belief, one must also state how that belief was obtained so that others may test the 
result. It also requires one to always be open to new evidence and ideas, and it requires a high level of 
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cooperation among members of the community of inquiry. Pragmatism’s model is “a group of inquirers 
trying to produce good ideas and trying to test them to see which ones have value” (Putnam, 1995, p. 
71, emphasis in original).
From Peirce’s initial formulation on the meaning of ideas, William James worked to establish criteria 
for determining the truth of ideas (Hickman and Alexander, 1998, pp. 5-10). For James, the test of the 
truth of any idea or belief is in its ‘cash-value’:
[I]deas (which themselves are but parts of experience) become true just in so far as they help us get 
into satisfactory relation with other parts of experience… [If] ideas prove to have value for concrete 
life, they will be true, for pragmatism, in the sense of being good for so much. (James, 1907, pp. 58, 73)
John Dewey’s pragmatism, also known as instrumentalism, dealt with “how thought functions in the 
experimental determinations of future consequences” (Hickman and Alexander, 1998, p. 9). For Dewey, 
ideas serve a mediating function in that they direct action that helps resolve some problematic or inde-
terminate situation (Marcell, 1974, p. 235). Thinking, rather than a quest for truth, is an instrumental 
attempt to adjust oneself to the environment. Thought guides action, and ideas are plans of action or 
hypotheses, rather than representations of immutable truths or ends. e world in which we live. Action 
guided by thought is thus experimental. One experiments with the environment and experiences conse-
quences, which provides feedback for future conduct. (Dewey, 1929, p. 138)
This experimentalism indicates Dewey’s view of science. He emphasized the methods and attitudes of 
science rather than its content (that is, its data, conclusions, and discoveries). Such an approach requires 
an open, tentative, and flexible epistemology:
… [a] willingness to hold belief in suspense, ability to doubt until evidence is obtained; willingness to go 
where evidence points instead of putting first a personally preferred conclusion; ability to hold ideas in 
solution and use them as hypotheses to be tested instead of dogmas to be asserted; and (possibly the most 
distinctive of all) enjoyment of new fields for inquiry and of new problems. (in Campbell, 1995, p. 102)
Such a posture, he argued, enabled more critical self-reflection and freed inquiry from reliance on 
outmoded, traditional methods such as “deduction from fixed truths” (p. 102).
An important feature of pragmatism is the way it collapses dichotomies--facts vs. values, ends vs. 
means, thought vs. action, theory vs. practice--that are inherent in other philosophical systems. The 
‘value’ of any idea, according to James, is simply a matter of the degree to which a particular arrange-
ment of facts serves to “carry us prosperously from one part of our experience to any other part, linking 
things satisfactorily” (1907, p. 58). Dewey stated, “It is therefore not the origin of a concept, it is its 
application which becomes the criterion of its value” (1998, p. 10). Since actions have value in their 
resolution of some problematical situation, value inheres in action; thus ‘ends’ (values) are inseparable 
from ‘means’ (actions). Further, thought is not something that happens in isolation from action. Rather, 
thinking involves the continual reflection on experience, which informs action to resolve and transform 
problem situations. Thus, thought and action (or theory and practice) function in an integrated way.
Pragmatism’s experimentalist bent made it an appropriate perspective for its times (Commager, 1950, 
pp. 95-100), and by all accounts, this way of thinking appealed to Americans at the turn of the twentieth 
century. Pragmatism gained popularity and influenced a range of institutions and academic disciplines, 
including law (Stone, 1966), political theory (Nichols, 1990), and education (Cremin, 1988).
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Pragmatism in Public Administration: Mary Parker Follett
In American PA, pragmatism was most evident in Mary Parker Follett’s work (Follett, 1918; 1930; 
Stever, 1986; Snider, 1998). Some PA writers like Gulick and Willoughby saw experience as leading to 
law-like generalizations or predictive rules of cause and effect. In contrast, Follett believed that the mere 
application of experience is no guarantee of success (1930, p. 71) because each situation is different from 
the previous. She held that principles were not fixed, but neither were they constantly shifting without 
basis. Experience accumulates and is integrated into principles that incorporate the contextual details 
of each situation (pp. 136-137). When principles are used in a new situation, the facts of that situation 
“contribute to those principles which by use again in the factual world become again transformed….” 
(p. 141). Thus, principles for Follett are hypotheses or tools for guiding action.
Follett’s pragmatism might appropriately be called ‘process pragmatism’ because of the overarch-
ing emphasis in her work on processes of interpersonal relating. This process pragmatism is evident in 
Brian Fry’s description of Follett’s ideas on the integration of individual wills and interest in authentic 
group relations:
[Group o]bjectives are not preexistent but emerge from the evolving situation as experience generates 
will and purpose. Integration, represented by agreement, comes from the uniting of experience, and its 
significance is derived not from the fact that values are held in common but that they are created in 
common. (1989, p. 103)
These concepts of emergent group will, purpose, interests, and values imply an almost radically dif-
ferent notion of one’s responsibility in a group. Responsibility commonly implies a burden or obligation 
to act or ‘do the right thing.’ Further, it implies an obligation to know what the right action is in a given 
situation. In Follett’s pragmatism, responsibility has to do with being in relationship with others as an 
integral part of the situation. One’s moral obligation is to submit to relating to other members, out of 
which will emerge the right thing to do.
Pragmatism on the Wane
Pragmatism’s heyday was relatively short-lived. By the late 1920s it had begun to be supplanted in the 
discipline of philosophy, mainly by logical positivism (Depew, 1995). Like pragmatism, logical positivism 
has a strong empiricist flavor. But whereas pragmatism integrates value and the facts of experience, logical 
positivism holds facts and values in separate and distinct realms. It thus seemed to offer a greater promise 
of certainty through intellectual rigor than pragmatism’s open and flexible epistemology would allow.
In the social sciences, logical positivism was manifested in behaviorist approaches to theory build-
ing, which in PA was exemplified by Herbert Simon’s Administrative Behavior, published in 1947. In 
such approaches theorists assume a causal direction from phenomena to theory; that is, they assume 
an objective reality that is independent of theory. By developing and describing behavioral cause-and-
effect relationships, theorists seek for the social sciences the same sorts of capabilities for value-neutral 
explanation, prediction, and control as those of the physical sciences.
Several contemporary writers have named behaviorism as the cause of a gap between administrative 
theory and practice. According to Harmon and Mayer (1986, p. 61), behaviorist theories are either so 
specific that they cannot be generalized for application to social issues, or so general that they neglect 
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critical variables. Bellavita (1990, p. 4) argues that behaviorism creates a separate and privileged posi-
tion for the social theorist, who seeks and discovers knowledge, relative to the practitioner, who merely 
applies knowledge. And since theory development proceeds independently of practice, many theories 
may simply be unrelated to practitioner concerns (Denhardt 1984, p. 178); hence the aforementioned 
legitimacy issue between acquisition and PA.
Such criticisms of behaviorism are part of a later-twentieth century ‘post-positivism’ that reflected 
disillusionment with its inability to deliver on promises of social progress through science. But no clear 
alternative to positivism emerged. Rather, a variety of perspectives surfaced to compete with positivism 
in the social sciences; hence the often-noted heterodoxy in PA (Fesler, 1975).
It should be noted that, during roughly the same time that it was being overtaken by logical positiv-
ism in philosophy and the social sciences, pragmatism was undergoing a different type of change in 
non-academic circles. Commager has described how pragmatism, because of its widespread popularity 
in American society during the early 1900s, became “vulgarized” (1964, p. 101). That is, many of its 
details and deeper implications, which were of such concern to Peirce, James, and Dewey, were simply 
ignored by the wider public. The term ‘pragmatism’ thus lost much of its original meaning and, in 
common usage, became equated merely with doing whatever works, that is, with simple practicality or, 
perhaps worse, with moral compromise.
Pragmatism’s Contemporary Revival
Though pragmatism has only recently returned to the fore in PA in an explicit way, a few writers antici-
pated its arrival by exhibiting strong tendencies toward pragmatism in their work. For example, in The 
Reflective Practitioner (1983), Donald Schon argued that positivism’s dominant epistemology, Technical 
Rationality, relies on an ‘after the fact’ science, that is, a body of established propositions derived from 
research. It thus fails to describe the ‘artful competence’ of practitioners, their way of ‘knowing-in-action’:
In his (sic) day to day practice he makes innumerable judgements of quality for which he cannot state 
adequate criteria, and he displays skills for which he cannot state the rules and procedures…[But] 
practitioners often think about what they are doing…As he tries to make sense of it, he also reflects on 
the understandings which have been implicit in his action, understandings which he surfaces, criticizes, 
restructures, and embodies in further action. (p. 49)
Schon proposed to replace Technical Rationality with ‘reflection-in-action’, a concept Peter Senge 
leveraged in his popular book The Fifth Discipline (1990). Here the researcher is
not dependent on the categories of established theory and technique, but constructs a new theory of 
the unique case . . . “[The researcher] does not separate thinking from doing . . . [B]ecause experiment-
ing is a kind of action, implementation is built into inquiry” (pp. 68-69).
On the heels of these and similar works hinting strongly of pragmatism, other writers began to draw 
upon it explicitly beginning in the 1980s. Richard Rorty (1989) is probably the best known contemporary 
proponent of pragmatism in the discipline of philosophy. Kenneth Gergen (1991) exemplifies the per-
spective of pragmatism in organization theory. In PA, writers who have focused on pragmatism include 
Stever (1986; 1993), Shields (1996; 2008), Miller and King (1998), and Snider (1998; 2000a; 2000b).
Ansell’s Pragmatist Democracy: Evolutionary Learning as Public Philosophy (2011) provides an 
excellent example of contemporary pragmatism in the PA context. Ansell does not propose to reform 
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American bureaucracy but rather to re-conceive its role as one of promoting the formation of problem-
solving communities. He argues that agencies serve as media to enable informed, collaborative, and 
evolutionary public learning. Realizing this perspective entails recasting an agency’s role from one of 
a functionalist organization to that of Pragmatist institution that solves social problems by engaging in 
experimental, fact-based public inquiry. Ansell relies significantly on Mary Parker Follett for her views 
on human interrelationships in organizations and society in his descriptions of how agencies may pro-
mote public inquiry.
Pragmatism in Acquisition
This section illustrates how acquisition might be different if pragmatism were a more prevalent way of 
thinking and acting. Of course, acquisition has several extremely problematic aspects to it, and if one 
focused on these, describing how pragmatism might transform acquisition would be extremely difficult 
and probably less than convincing. This issue may be avoided by focusing on an “operational” level of 
acquisition and describing some areas that will be familiar to acquisition practitioners. Because pragmatism 
grounds meaning in experience, this operational level is appropriate for descriptions of transformations 
in day-to-day practice.
To begin, acquisition is briefly described in a way that emphasizes its current flavor of positivism 
and technical rationality. This serves to highlight the contrast with acquisition approaches that are based 
in pragmatism.
The ‘Current DoD Perspective’ of Acquisition and Program Management
According to a DoD institution charged with teaching acquisition professionals, acquisition is defined as
The conceptualization, initiation, design, development, test, contracting, production, deployment, logis-
tic support, modification, and disposal of weapons and other systems, supplies, or services (including 
construction) to satisfy DoD needs, intended for use in or in support of military missions. (Defense 
Acquisition University, 2012)
This illustrates what may be called, for the sake of convenience, the ‘current DoD perspective’ of 
acquisition. This perspective portrays an aspect of rationality in acquisition. That is, acquisition responds 
to military needs and requirements, through applications of resources, with various outputs that include 
plans, designs, and reports, as well as finished products for the military user. There is also the aspect of 
a weapon system ‘life-cycle’. First, a perceived military need leads to the generation of specific require-
ments for a new item. Next, a program of activities with necessary resources is initiated, and the item 
matures through design, development, and testing. After production and fielding, the item is used until 
it is no longer needed and retired from service.1
The current DoD perspective also reflects certain functions of acquisition. These include technical 
functions (e.g. design, test, production, and logistics), as well as administrative functions (e.g. planning, 
directing, and reporting) that are familiar to PA students. The range of career fields of the DoD acquisition 
workforce (e.g. financial management, systems engineering, and contracting), as well as the broad range 
of locales where acquisition activities occur (e.g. labs, depots, test ranges, and the Pentagon) indicate 
the functional diversity of acquisition.
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Program management (sometimes called project management) occupies a central spot in the current 
DoD perspective of acquisition. Project management concepts, methods, and organizations became the 
means by which DoD attempted to exploit and integrate scientific and technological advances in increas-
ingly capable and complex weapon systems that often took many years to develop and produce. The 
program manager (PM), according to the DoD perspective, is the single leader/manager who coordinates 
the activities of the various administrative and technical functional areas and makes tradeoff decisions 
among cost, schedule, and performance considerations according to judgments of risk in the program.
Clearly the perspective presented in this definition reflects the classic PA theme of politically neutral 
competence. But PMs are, by virtue of their positions, also proponents and advocates of their programs. 
Hence they find themselves heavily implicated in politics and devote significantly more time and energy 
to program advocacy (that is, ‘selling’ their programs to Pentagon or Congressional officials) than to 
other technical or administrative activities (Fox, 1988, pp. 161-3). Additionally, recent studies of PM 
competencies indicate that ‘political awareness’ and ‘relationship development’ are more important than 
‘managerial orientation’ or ‘results orientation’ (McVeigh, 1995).
This admittedly superficial glance at the current DoD perspective of acquisition reveals something 
of the positivism and technical rationality in PA against which writers on pragmatism have reacted. 
This perspective implies more “reliance on technological fixes” (Harmon, 1981, pp. 176) than Schon’s 
‘artful competence.’
Possible Transformations: The User’s Requirement
U.S. federal agencies periodically perform a process of ‘needs assessment’ to assess perceived shortcom-
ings in the way they operate (Office of the Management and Budget, 1976). In DoD, such assessments 
may lead to changes in organizations, tactics, doctrine, or equipment. In the event of a required ‘hardware’ 
solution (i.e., a new start acquisition program), administrators representing the eventual ‘user’ (i.e., the 
operational forces) prepare a formal needs document, which for new major programs must be validated 
and approved by the highest levels of acquisition officials.
Under DoD systems engineering concepts, these ‘mission need statements’ form the basis for system-
specific operational requirements, which for an airplane might include required airspeed, payload, and 
range, among many more. The ‘operational requirements document’ lists all of these for a proposed new 
system and also undergoes a rigorous validation and approval process. The operational requirements 
provide the basis for technical requirements and specifications, which in turn are the bases for design-
ing lower level subsystems, components, and parts. Of course, industry participates heavily throughout 
this requirement development process by proposing alternative concepts, performing feasibility studies, 
and testing initial designs.
For highly complex, state-of-the-art weapon systems such as new aircraft, tanks, and ships, this process 
of ‘flowing down’ requirements from need to design, and then testing, refining, and producing the design 
usually lasts several years. This is a highly rational, top-down approach in which the fielded system’s 
performance depends upon proper design, which depends upon proper definition of the requirement. 
To govern this process, DoD has promulgated numerous and often rigorous procedures for management 
and engineering planning, integration of the various acquisition disciplines and functions, control, and 
accountability (see, for example, Department of Defense, 2015).
‘Program stability’ is an explicit goal in current DoD acquisition policy (Department of Defense, 
2003), but acquisition programs proceed in very unstable external environments. The original condi-
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tions, forecasts, or assumptions under which requirements were developed often change as a result of 
changes in national security policy, fiscal policy, defense missions, and any number of other areas. Such 
changes are especially significant given the length of time needed to design, test, and produce major 
systems like ships, aircraft, and tanks.
The process described above, however, contributes to a kind of ‘requirements inertia’ once they are 
approved. First, the process for changing requirements may be as rigorous and involved as that for approv-
ing the original requirements. More importantly, because needs and requirements drive designs, changes 
in requirements mean changes in design, which usually translate into cost increases and schedule slips. 
These may be interpreted as evidence of mismanagement, attracting unfavorable attention and opening 
the program to increased scrutiny and criticism. Understandably then, acquisition administrators are 
reluctant to change requirements once they have been approved. They have little reason or incentive to 
maintain a dialogue concerning the continuing validity and relevance of the requirement, and by extension 
of the eventual system itself. Rather, the tendency may be for both the PM, the user, and others to defend 
the original requirement and discount any subsequent changes in threats, missions, or security policy in 
order to protect program stability. Thus, while there may be genuine dialogue among participants during 
initial development of requirements, dialogue tends to be suppressed once requirements are approved.
This tendency to hold firm on requirements may contribute to program stability, but it may also lead 
to the development and deployment of systems that have less than desirable performance. Some systems 
may simply not fit in a new environment for which they were not designed. Others may encounter design 
issues and failures in testing, something quite common in systems employing stressing new technologies, 
that may require substantial additional resources to resolve. One possible way to resolve such problems 
would be to relax stressing requirements. But if requirements are held firm, these ‘fixes’ may be paid for 
by reductions in program scope, which can result in less than satisfactory fielded systems. For example, 
the number of planned tests may be scaled back, which results in decreased confidence in performance. 
Or perhaps logistics elements or training manuals may be deferred for a year or two, which may mean 
a less capable system and less capable operators.
The conventional wisdom as to how to respond to uncertainty in acquisition seems to say, ‘manage 
better.’ That is, administrators need to do better jobs in forecasting, planning, budgeting, and controlling 
acquisition programs. To give two examples, current policy requires PMs to obtain detailed intelligence 
estimates of future threats to the system, and also to develop ‘risk management’ plans, which attempt to 
detail possible future problems for the program and the strategies for dealing with them as they arise. The 
underlying assumption here is that more information and better techniques will allow a PM to foresee 
various contingencies, to plan for them, and to control them to ensure program stability.
From the perspective of pragmatism, mission needs and requirements would not be held firm. Rather, 
they would be considered more as hypotheses to be continually tested, questioned, and modified in light 
of changing conditions. Requirements would evolve through a process of continuing open dialogue as 
they were studied and tested. Throughout design and development, participants would ask, “Is this still 
what we want the system to do?” Under pragmatism, the term ‘provisional operational characteristic’ 
might be an appropriate replacement for ‘requirement’. Pragmatism in acquisition would also mean that 
an acquisition program might take on the character of a continuing experiment. Again, at each stage of 
design, development, and production, the PM, the user, and others would re-visit the question, “Is this 
still the system we need?” in light of its progress and the current external environment. All participants 
would be willing to terminate the experiment if the answer was “no”.2
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Some will object that such a frame of mind is simply unacceptable, that especially in times of national 
danger, decisive action is needed. But pragmatism doesn’t imply inaction. On the contrary, pragmatism 
implies learning through action; it emphasizes and relies on action. Recall pragmatism’s formula: Mean-
ing comes from the experiences of action. Thus, in order for anyone to judge the meaning (or value) 
of a program, action regarding the program is necessary. Pragmatism does see action as tentative, not 
in an indecisive or half-hearted sense, but rather in the sense that its result or meaning is subject to in-
terpretation. Thus actions in acquisition would be viewed, again, as experiments. They would have an 
open-ended or non-binding character. Such a view doesn’t hinder action, but rather it enables action by 
facilitating agreement both on the action to take and on its implementation.
Hints of pragmatism were seen in a couple of acquisition initiatives during the 1990s. These were 
intended as ways to reduce ‘cycle time’ or to inject advanced technological capabilities into new systems, 
but they may illuminate the possibilities and potential of pragmatism. One new trend is for programs 
to have provisions for prototype models to be fielded to users in order to get early feedback on system 
performance and suitability. A similar initiative is the Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration 
(Thirtle et al., 1997), in which many of the usual rules and procedures governing acquisition are set 
aside in order to field a promising new capability quickly and in very limited quantities. This enables 
users to experiment with and evaluate new technologies to assess their potential for more widespread 
use. Finally, the recent increased emphasis on procuring commercially available, ‘off the shelf’ items 
signifies a desire to reduce the time between need identification and product fielding. Increased reliance 
on these items implies a greater possibility that all involved in acquisition will be better able to reach 
agreements on what solutions are available and on what action to take.
Teams in Acquisition
The preceding discussion implies the need for almost Follettan-like group processes in the area of 
requirements. Such processes are hinted at in recent DoD acquisition policies on “Integrated Product 
Teams” (Wagner and White, 1995), which attempt to make teaming a standard practice. The intent of 
these policies is that teams will be formed from representatives of various acquisition disciplines, agen-
cies, and stakeholders so that issues and problems, along with appropriate responses, may be surfaced 
and pursued early on. This should allow acquisition processes to proceed in a concurrent and integrated 
way, rather than the more sequential and ‘stove-piped’ methods of the past. Teaming policies borrow 
heavily from recent management theory (Katzenbach and Smith, 1993) and the quality movement to 
bring in such concepts as open communications, team member commitment and empowerment, and 
process ownership.
This idea of teaming suggests how a Follettan, process-based pragmatism might be made manifest 
in acquisition. With a turn toward pragmatism, team members would not concern themselves with is-
sues of compromise or consensus. Rather their principal concern would be with the authenticity of their 
relationships, submission to group processes, and the discovery of a particular emergent purpose and 
integrative approach for their team.
These words may conjure for some readers a vision of teams as perpetual encounter groups. Follett 
had something different in mind, though. Recall her words from earlier in this chapter when she spoke 
of the need for “experiment after experiment . . . many experiments.” Clearly Follett, in her pragmatism, 
saw group member relations and group purposes as emerging from shared understandings of the group’s 
experiences. Follett’s thinking on this point might be summarized: “Keep acting; keep talking.”
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To conclude this section, the changing role of the PM from the perspective of pragmatism should be 
noted. Rather than a politically-neutral expert manager, the PM would be an actor who has an appreciation 
for the needs and interests of others actors and who also has an appreciation for the current conditions 
and circumstances of the acquisition environment. The PM would act as a central and active catalyst 
in facilitating dialogue, relationships, and meaning creation among all participants. As Follett put it in 
speaking of a leader, “Above all, he (sic) should make his co-workers see that it is not his purpose which 
is to be achieved, but a common purpose, born of the desires and activities of the group” (1940, p. 262; 
emphasis in original). The identity and legitimacy of this particular acquisition administrator would thus 
stem not only from personal management skills and expertise, but also, perhaps even primarily, from the 
nature and character of his or her relationships to others in acquisition.
CONCLUSION: POSSIBLE TRANSFORMATIONS
One goal of this chapter was to give readers a sense of what pragmatism has to offer above mere prac-
ticality and moral relativism. While pragmatism certainly emphasizes ‘what works’, it has a bias for 
action and a forward-looking, experimentalist character that is impatient with the status quo. While it 
does seek meaning in experience, it is the shared experience of a community of inquirers that provides 
the grounding for meaning. The saying, ‘Works for me’ doesn’t fit pragmatism; ‘Works for us’ does.
The last part of this chapter attempted to give a sense of what acquisition might look like if it were 
transformed by pragmatism, and it noted what some might consider the radical nature of this transforma-
tion. Herein lies a significant challenge to the adoption of pragmatism within acquisition. Bureaucracies 
are of course by nature highly conservative (Wilson, 1989) and typically amenable only to incremental 
change (Wildavsky and Caiden, 2001). One may rightfully question the extent to which acquisition is 
amenable to the type of paradigm shift (Kuhn, 1970) that would be entailed in adopting the pragmatism 
of Peirce, James, Dewey, and Follett.
A question also exists regarding any calls made by PA scholars for acquisition to adopt pragmatism 
as a guiding mode of thought and action. Earlier, the vulgarization of pragmatism as a simple attitude of 
practicality was noted. Thus, any calls that may be made for the adoption of pragmatism must be clear as 
to what, precisely, acquisition professionals are being called. If it is to a simple ‘practical pragmatism’, 
they may respond that acquisition has always strove for workable solutions, so what’s new? If it is to 
‘radical pragmatism’, they may question the feasibility of adoption and dismiss the call as idealistic and 
unworkable. Either case will only perpetuate the legitimacy problem between acquisition and PA – that 
PA continues to fail to provide useful theory and tools.
The author has no good solution to this dilemma, having argued elsewhere (Snider, 2005) that the 
mainstream of American PA has through its history rejected the philosophical pragmatism of Peirce, 
James, Dewey, and Follett in favor of general attitudes of practicality. Absent a major event that shakes 
and calls into question their predominant rationalist paradigms, both PA and acquisition have no need 
for the radical change envisioned by the pragmatist philosophers. From this viewpoint, pragmatism waits 
in the wings for the ‘propitious moment’ (McSwite, 1999) when it is welcomed as an alternative by a 
receptive audience that is eager for change.
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ENDNOTES
1 The extent to which acquisition proceeds “rationally” at the level of practice, is questionable. As-
sessments of acquisition’s irrationality are given in books like Weapons without a Cause (Farrell, 
1997), The Pentagon Paradox (Stevenson, 1993), and Foregone Conclusions (Lebovic, 1996).
2 Obviously, new and more flexible approaches to contracting, budgeting, program oversight, and 
other functions would be needed to make such an approach feasible.
